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As Bob Marley said, “If you know your history, then you would know where you’re coming from.”

Wednesday’s post — My Proprietary Chipset — included hyperlinks to specific publications and websites from the 2000s. Some of these are more easily accessed than others. For instance, the link to my testimony before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission in the 109th Session of Congress (2005) takes you directly to that testimony. However, the links to my testimony at the 108th (2003) and 107th (2001) sessions takes you to the full text of the Commission’s work covering the full session and it takes some perseverance to find one’s way to my testimony. In the spirit of presenting my work on these issues from the 2000s in one, easily accessed location, I will add here to the blog a few archive posts to fill in behind Wednesday’s My Proprietary Chipset post providing readier access to those harder-to-navigate publications.

2003 Testimony, 108th Session of Congress

SUMMARY:

In the information technology sector, Taiwan semiconductor and electronics manufacturing firms are major global actors, and their
expansion into China continues, but without noticeable erosion of Taiwan equity control. In testimony before the Commission, Merritt Cooke, former senior commercial officer at the American Institute in Taiwan, attributed this to the relative stability of ‘‘highly differentiated, high-value supply chains’’ as opposed to the ‘‘instability of far simpler manufacturer-retailer networks characteristic of commodity products.’’ Cooke believes this distinction helps explain the historical pattern of Taiwan investment into the mainland. While many light industry sectors that Taiwan moved to the mainland in the 1980s and 1990s ‘‘have been swallowed up by mainland competitors,’’ highly differentiated, relatively high-value consumer products such as brand-name athletic shoes and high-performance bicycles have remained largely in Taiwan equity hands. ‘‘If these product sectors, with their relatively lower levels of technology and slower product cycles, could stay in Taiwan control for decades, there is every reason to believe that the various IT [information technology] hardware sectors will stay even more firmly in Taiwan’s grip in years ahead,’’ Cooke said. Despite the large and growing Taiwan business presence in the mainland and burgeoning indirect cross-Strait trade and investment, there is a sense in the Taipei business community that Taiwan itself—as a venue for investment, manufacturing, logistics, or finance—is in danger of becoming marginalized within Asia. Kaohsiung’s container port—once the fourth busiest in the world— now ranks sixth, with the Chinese ports of Shenzhen and Shanghai jumping ahead. The American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan reports that a number of U.S. corporations’ regional headquarters in Taiwan have been eliminated or downgraded to local offices.

2001 Testimony, 107th Session of Congress

TESTIMONY:

STATEMENT OF MERRITT TODD COOKE, JR., CHIEF, COMMERCIAL SECTION, AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN

Mr. COOKE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I hope the Commission will feel free to overlook the confusion that my parents introduced
with my legal name and call me by the name that I most often respond to, Terry. [Laughter.]
I will also request that, with the consent of the Commission, some paragraphs that I delete in the interest of brevity do be entered into the record. I will spare the Commission a recap of Taiwan’s ten-year structural transformation in the 1990s.
It is an honor to be asked to testify in front of this distinguished panel of Commissioners. In the following brief statement, I will bring to bear my perspective as current Chief of the Commercial Section at the American Institute in Taiwan to address the issues
identified by the Commission in its July 24 invitation letter, specifically the growing interdependence of the U.S., Taiwan, and Chinese high-tech economies.
The strategic interdependence of the U.S. and Taiwan economies has grown steadily throughout the 1990s as Taiwan’s economy has shifted from its traditional structure as a labor-intensive export-oriented economy towards a more service-oriented investment and technology-intensive economy. While Taiwan’s industrial sector has shrunk in relative terms over this period, capital and technology-intensive industries have expanded dramatically. These industries accounted for approximately 75 percent of total manufacturing in 2000, compared to 48 percent in 1986.
Taiwan now supplies 60 percent of the world’s motherboards and is the world’s leading supplier of notebook computers, monitors,
mice, keyboards, video cards, sound cards, on/off switches, LAN cards, graphic cards, scanners, and laser disk drives. Through the
strength of its foundry model, Taiwan has emerged as a preeminent semiconductor supplier to the world.
This transition from the production of labor-intensive goods to high-tech goods has to date proceeded relatively smoothly, even
against the background turbulence of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 and a major earthquake occurring on September 21, 1999.
Against the broad backdrop of its structural transformation, two major dynamics have emerged: First, the growing regional partnership and global interdependence of the U.S. and Taiwan high-tech industries, and secondly, the accelerating shift of the lower end of Taiwan’s high-tech production offshore, particularly to mainland China.
One clear indicator of the degree of evolving interdependence with the U.S. was the fact that following the 9/21 earthquake in
Taiwan, the tech markets in New York dropped more in percentage terms than in Taipei.
The scale of this interdependence is likewise highlighted in other ways. For example, four of the top U.S. suppliers of PCs alone procured $20 billion of components from Taiwan to support their 1999 global sales. Additionally, Taiwan will soon have more state-of-the-art 300-millimeter chip wafer fabs in operation than the U.S., Germany, Japan, or any other world market.
The accelerating shift of high-tech production from Taiwan to mainland China has been equally pronounced over this period. The
Taiwan government’s Office of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics reported in February that government approved Taiwan investments in China for 2000 more than doubled from the 1999 levels.
The Taipei Computer Association reported in the same month that 30 percent of Taiwan’s 411 high-technology companies had established major investments in mainland China and that fully 90 percent of those 411 companies planned to be invested in China by the end of 2001.
Lastly, China edged out Taiwan in 2000 for the first time for the number three slot in world IT production value. China came in behind the U.S. and Japan, with $25.5 billion of production value, against Taiwan in fourth place with $23 billion. The key point to
note, however, is that Taiwanese companies generated fully 70 percent of that $25.5 production value in mainland China.
The impending accessions of China and Taiwan to the WTO will likely further accelerate this process of growing cross-straits commercial interdependence in high-tech, with consequent implications for the already highly interdependent U.S. and Taiwan high-tech economies. Although Taiwan’s relatively late liberalization and privatization of its fixed-line monopoly regime will limit somewhat the impact of this development in the telecom sector, the likely effect will be continued fast accelerating cross-straits interdependence in sectors such as PC and notebook assembly, motherboard and other PC component manufacture, production of chip sets for mobile telephony and other applications, scanner and computer peripheral production, and lower end IC production.
A number of important trends will reinforce WTO financial linkages and commercial disciplines and tend to produce this outcome.
First, the network of business relationships which Taiwan firms have established in China represents largely an extension into
China of preexisting product and service supply chain relationships originally established in Taiwan. This greater Taiwan phenomenon in China, localized in growth centers such as Donguan in Guangdong, Xianen in Fujian, and increasingly in the greater Shanghai area, has now reached a critical mass sufficient for greater efficiency in the global supply chain.
Second, the commoditization of IT production worldwide is increasingly pressuring production costs, forcing manufacturers to
distribute a growing number of lower end steps in their production processes to the world’s lowest-cost production centers. Under more than a decade of the KMT or Guangdong’s ‘‘Go South’’ policy, Taiwan manufacturers have quite fully exploited the advantages of relatively low-cost production centers in the Philippines, Thailand, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the one exception to that probably being an expected spurt of Taiwan investment in Vietnam following the ratification and implementation of the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement.
At the same time, the KMTs, and now the new administration, the DPP’s ‘‘go slow’’ policy vis-a-vis investment in the mainland has tended to limit the degree to which Taiwan firms could take advantage of the even lower costs of production in China. However, since cost pressure started mounting sharply in March 2000, Taiwan high-tech firms have found themselves no longer able to maintain global competitiveness without relocating a greater share of their production to China, the lowest cost major production center in the Asian production platform.
A third trend really represents a number of technology trends that underlie an emerging division of labor in high-tech production
between Taiwan and the PRC. Without trying to go into any of these, I would just note the increasing specialization of national
economies in the globalized IT industry segments. For instance, fully half of Finland’s GDP is dedicated to wireless telephony.
Secondly, the migration of value away from hardware assembly and towards embedded software technologies in scanners, in peripherals, in Internet appliances, and so on.
And a third technology trend being the steep rise in investment costs and shorter product cycles in the IC semiconductor sector.
A fourth and final trend, the Taiwan and China markets are
largely complementary, creating unique opportunities for commercial cooperation between these political rivals. For instance, Taiwan firms have generally failed to establish global brand and to capture the higher valuations that accrue to brand-name products. However, the large size of the China market, the skill and cultural familiarity of Taiwan business managers, and the high regard which China’s consumers have for Taiwan’s products are now giving Taiwan firms a chance to establish brand names on a large-scale regional basis as opposed to global basis.
Each one of these trends holds important implications for U.S. interests. The establishment of Taiwan regional brands might, for
instance, tend to weaken the existing cooperative bonds between U.S. and Taiwan alliance partners and foster more direct competition in the region. Conversely, the combination of U.S. innovation, Taiwan regional management skill, and the largely untapped potential of the developing China market is already creating a set of
opportunities for enhanced commercial cooperation among traditional U.S. and Taiwan partners.
The rapid proliferation of commercial ties between Taiwan and China is of major importance to U.S. interests. There are the narrower set of commercial implications for the U.S. competitive posture in regional and global markets, to which I have just alluded. Also, as Rupert Hammond Chambers, President of the U.S. ROC Business Council suggested in his June 14 testimony to this Commission, there are equally important implications which fast-growing commercial interdependence between Taiwan and China have for traditional U.S. military and security interests in the Straits of Taiwan.
I commend the Commission for focusing attention on the extent to which commercial dynamics in the computer electronics and telecommunications sectors are affecting these interests. It is my personal observation that these market and technology-driven dynamics are not always fully captured in the dialogue regarding our key
interests in this potential flash point region of the world. Thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MERRITT TODD COOKE, JR.
It is an honor to be asked to testify in front of this distinguished panel of Commissioners. It is also, personally, a distinct pleasure to see again a number of former Departmental and Embassy colleagues as well as others with whom I have had the
past pleasure of working on various overseas and stateside activities. In the following brief statement, I will bring to bear my perspective as current Chief of the Commercial Section at the American Institute in Taiwan to address the issues identified by the Commission in its July 24th invitation letter.
The strategic interdependence of the U.S. and Taiwan economies has grown steadily throughout the 1990s as Taiwan’s economy has shifted from its traditional structure as a labor-intensive, export-oriented economy towards a more services-oriented,
investment- and technology-intensive economy. While Taiwan’s industrial sector has
shrunk in relative terms over this period, capital- and technology-intensive industries have expanded dramatically. These industries accounted for approximately 75 percent of total manufacturing in 2000, compared to 48 percent in 1986. During this
structural transition, labor-intensive industries, such as toys, footwear, umbrellas,
and garments, relocated offshore. Their place was taken by petrochemicals, metal products, machinery, and ‘‘most dramatically during the 1990s’’ by technology-oriented industries, such as electronic, electric, and information products.
By 2000, more than half of the top ten manufacturing firms in Taiwan were electronic and computer manufacturing firms, compared with only two in 1993. More than half of the top ten manufactured products were in the areas of integrated circuits (ICs), personal computers, and computer peripherals, whereas in 1993, only ICs had been among the top ten. Taiwan now supplies 60% of the world’s motherboards and is the world’s leading supplier of notebook computers, monitors, mice, keyboards, video cards, sound cards, on-off switches, LAN cards, graphics cards, scanners, and laser disk drives. Through the strength of its foundry model, Taiwan has emerged as a preeminent semiconductor supplier to the world. This transition from the production of labor-intensive goods to high-tech goods has, to date, proceeded relatively smoothly, even against the background turbulence of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–98 and a major earthquake occurring on September 21, 1999.
Against the broad backdrop of this structural transformation, two major dynamics have emerged: (1) the growing regional partnership and global interdependence of the U.S. and Taiwan high-tech industries and (2) the accelerating shift of the lowerend of Taiwan’s high-tech production offshore, particularly to mainland China. One clear indicator of the degree of evolving interdependence with the U.S. was the fact that, following the 9–21(–99) earthquake in Taiwan, the tech markets in New York
dropped more in percentage terms than in Taipei. The scale of this interdependence is likewise highlighted in other ways. For example, four of the top U.S. suppliers of PCs alone procured $20 billion (USD) of components from Taiwan to support their
1999 global sales. Additionally, Taiwan will soon have more state-of-the-art 300mm chip-wafer fabs in operation than the U.S., Germany, Japan or any other world market.
The accelerating shift of high-tech production from Taiwan to mainland China has been equally pronounced over this period. The Taiwan Government’s Office of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics reported in February that government-approved Taiwan investments in China for 2000 more than doubled from the 1999 levels. The Taipei Computer Association reported in the same month that 30 percent of Taiwan’s 411 high technology companies had established major investments in mainland China and that fully 90 percent of those 411 companies planned to be invested in China by the end of 2001. Lastly, China edged out Taiwan in 2000 for the first time for the number three slot in world IT production value. China came in behindthe U.S. and Japan with $25.5 billion of production value against Taiwan in fourth place with $23 billion. The key point to note, however, is that Taiwanese companies generated fully 70% of that $25.5 production value in Mainland China.
The impending accessions of China and Taiwan to the WTO will likely further accelerate this process of growing cross-straits commercial interdependence in hightech, with consequent implications for the already highly interdependent U.S. and Taiwan high-tech economies. Although Taiwan’s relatively late liberalization and privatization of its fixed-line monopoly regime will limit somewhat the impact of this development in the telecoms sector, the likely effect will be continued fast-accelerating cross-straits interdependence in sectors such as PC and notebook assembly, motherboard and other PC component manufacture, production of chipsets for mobile telephony and other applications, scanner and computer peripheral production, and lower-end IC production. A number of important trends will reinforce WTO financial linkages and commercial disciplines and tend to produce this outcome:
—First, the network of business relationships which Taiwan firms have established in China represents largely an extension into China of pre-existing product and service supply-chain relationships originally established in Taiwan. This ‘‘Greater Taiwan’’ phenomenon in China, localized in growth centers such as Dongguan (Guangdong), Xiamen (Fujian) and, increasingly, the Greater
Shanghai area, has now reached a critical mass sufficient for greater efficiency in the global supply chain;
—Second, the commoditization of IT production worldwide is increasingly pressuring production costs, forcing manufacturers to distribute a growing number of lower-end steps in their production processes to the world’s lowest-cost production centers. Under more than a decade of the KMT’s ‘‘Go South’’ policy, Taiwan manufacturers have quite fully exploited the advantages of relatively low-cost production centers in the Philippines, Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. (The exception to this being an expected spurt of Taiwan investment in Vietnam following the ratification and implementation of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement). At the same time, the KMT’s (and now the DPP’s) ‘‘Go Slow’’ policy vis-a`-vis investment in the mainland tended to limit the degree to which Taiwan firms could take advantage of the even lower costs-of-production in China. However, since cost pressures started mounting sharply in March 2000, Taiwan high-tech firms have found themselves no longer able to maintain
global competitiveness without relocating a greater share of their production to China, the lowest-cost major production center in the Asian production platform;
—Third, a number of technology trends underlie an emerging division of labor in high-tech production between Taiwan and the PRC. Among these, are (a) the increasing specialization of national economies in globalized IT industry-segments (e.g., fully half of Finland’s GDP is now generated from wireless related technologies); (b) the migration of value away from hardware assembly and towards imbedded software (e.g., scanners and other peripherals, Internet Appliances, etc.); and (c) the steep rise in investment cost and shorter product cycles in the IC/semiconductor sector; and
—Fourth, the Taiwan and China markets are largely complementary, creating
unique opportunities for commercial cooperation between these political rivals. For instance, Taiwan firms have generally failed to establish global brands and to capture the higher market valuations that accrue to brand-name products. However, the large size of the China market, the skill and cultural familiarity of Taiwan business managers with that market, and the high regard which Chinese consumers have for Taiwan products, are now giving Taiwan firms the chance to establish brand-names on a large-scale regional basis. Further, Taiwan’s proven skills in development and service-oriented management of global IT technologies, coupled with the breadth and potential of China’s basic research capabilities, create distinct opportunities for partnership in regional innovation.
Each one of these trends holds important implications for U.S. interests. The establishment of Taiwan regional brands might, for instance, tend to weaken the existing cooperative bonds between U.S. and Taiwan alliance partners and foster more direct competition in the region. Conversely, the combination of U.S. innovation, Taiwan regional management skill, and the largely-untapped potential of the developing China market is already creating a set of opportunities for enhanced commercial cooperation among traditional U.S. and Taiwan partners.
The rapid proliferation of commercial ties between Taiwan and China is of major importance to U.S. interests. There are the narrower set of commercial implications for the U.S. competitive posture in regional and global markets, to which I have just
alluded. Also, as Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President of the U.S.-R.O.C. (Taiwan) Business Council, suggested in his June 14 testimony to this Commission, there are equally important implications which fast-growing commercial interdependence between Taiwan and China have for traditional U.S. military and security interests in the Straits of Taiwan. I commend the Commission for focusing attention on the extent to which commercial dynamics in the computer electronics and telecommunications sectors are affecting these interests. It is my personal observation that these market- and technology-driven dynamics are not always fully captured in the dialogue regarding our key interests in this potential flashpoint region of the world.

The summer’s over and the new work-year has begun. No better way to kick it off than with a reprise of our summer’s big news — China Partnership of Greater Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia were recognized at the annual high-level U.S.-China talks in Beijing this summer with one of six new U.S.-China EcoPartnerships.  Our partner is the Tianjin Economic-technological Development Area or TEDA.  Our PHL-TEDA EcoPartnership focuses on funded projects in Tianjin for smartgrid online monitoring systems (OMS), wetlands urban water management (WUWM), and green building energy efficiency (GBEE).

EcoPartnership w Kerry, Baucus & PodestaBack row: Philadelphia Delegates Terry Cooke, CPGP (4th from left) and Gary Biehn, White & Williams (2nd from left)

Front row (from right to left) China’s State Councilor Jiechi Yang , Sec of State Kerry, Amb. Baucus & Counselor to the President, John Podesta

 

In other posts to follow, I’ll share some more background on what the five-year old U.S.-China EcoPartnership program is (and why it matters), give thumbnails on the other five EcoPartnership awardees in 2014, and provide a listing of the twenty-four active EcoPartners since the inauguration of the program in 2014.

 

In the meanwhile, here are links publicizing our new three-year PHL-TEDA EcoPartnership:

U.S. State Department Press Release

Secretary Kerry remarks at July 10th EcoPartnership signing ceremony

U.S. Government website for the U.S.-China EcoPartnership program

Official photo from U.S. Department of State

City of Philadelphia Press Release (on City’s blog)

City of Philadelphia Press Release (on City Facebook page)

 

Happy Year of the Snake!

I have some major catching up to do so let me begin here with a link to my book which the Wilson Center launched on September 24, 2012.  (Note: if you want to download the PDF of the book, just right-click and use the Save As option).

Book Cover

More 2012/3 updates to follow in rapid sequence.

Thanks for hanging in there,

Thanks to everyone for their support in 2011 and my best wishes for your health and happiness in 2012!

The U.S./China Clean Energy blog ends the year with close to six thousand views, a level I believe can increase several fold next year following the January 2012 release of Sustaining U.S.-China Cooperation in Clean Energy by the Kissinger Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center (WashDC).

I’ll close out the year by giving you this preview of Cooketop News, my Paper.Li aggregator providing “front-burner” updates about the U.S. Mid-Atlantic connection and “hot” insights on clean energy technology, investment and policy.  Okay, I’ll remove tongue from cheek now.  More prosaically, Cooketop News will be hitting the Internet airwaves on a regular daily basis (Mon-Fri) starting Monday, January 2nd. A summary of top stories will then be provided each week in a Friday post here on U.S./China Clean Energy along with personal observations about what impact the weeks events are having on ‘U.S.-China sustainability’ trends.

Here is the summary of stories from this week’s trial run:

Monday, December 26, 2011

California’s new Renewables Portfoliio Standard (RPS) program

 Predictions for Cleantech in 2012

 The smart grid according to Cisco

 How do you say ‘Google Search’ in Chinese? 2011 top search results in Asia

 China continues tradition of Christmas crackdowns

Tuesday, December 27, 2011

 JDS Architects wins major Green Building Design Award in Hangzhou

U.S. smart grid gets US$8bn boost toward a smarter and greener future

SEIA & GTM Research release “U.S. Solar Market Insight: 3rd Q 2011” report   

China proposes collecting bio-data on foreign visitors

 Big Oil redrawing the energy map with unconventional fuels

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

Retrofits are the new darling for energy efficiency investors

China needs new policy course as capital tide turns

China plans Asia’s biggest coal-fired plant

Interactive map for tracking China’s global investment by sector

10 predictions for Cleantech and Sustainability in 2012

Thursday, December 29, 2011

Top 10 clean energy stories of 2011

China’s energy consumption now double the world average

U.S. DoE supporting research into advanced solar thermal

China drafting plan protect copper & other investments in Afghanistan

New funding could help lower cost of electric vehicle (EV) chargers

Friday, December 30, 2011

Food security to be a concern for China in 2012

Beijing on the horns of a new yuan exchange rate dilemma

Does China’s rare earth’s monopoly imperil clean energy?

Gordon Chang updates his ‘coming collapse of China’ prediction, 10 yrs later

5 predictions for Boston Cleantech in 2012

 

That’s it for 2011!  Enjoy an exhilarating slide into 2012 and I’ll look forward to seeing you on the other side of New Year’s Day.   Best wishes for the new year!

On October 11th, Mark Muro, Policy Director of The Brookings Institution’s Metropolitan Policy Program, presented the national-level chapter of the story of ‘Greater Philadelphia’s 21st century Clean Energy Opportunity’ at an event I organized in Philadelphia for the Academy of Natural Sciences of Drexel University and the T.C. Chan Center for Building Simulation & Energy Studies of the University of Pennsylvania.

According to Muro, Philadelphia enjoys key advantages due to: (1) its position as #5 top-performing cluster nationally, (2) its participation in a national trajectory of fast-growing, high-quality jobs, (3) its profile of balance with middle-skill, middle-wage ‘green collar’ jobs; (4) its breadth of clean economy segments (air & water purification, lighting, nuclear, mass transit, professional energy services, solar PV, solar thermal, and wind); and (5) its location in the middle of the most vibrant clean economy corridor in the country (from Albany NY and Boston MA down to Washington DC and northern Virginia).

Future posts will help tell the other chapters of this story, including the City of Philadelphia perspective (Alan Greenberger, Deputy Mayor for Economic Development), the regional perspective (Mark Hughes, Task Leader for Policy, Markets & Behavior at the Greater Philadelphia Innovation Cluster for Building Energy Efficiency (GPIC), the global perspective (Amy Fraenkel, UN Environmental Programme Regional Director for North America) and the U.S./China strategic opportunity (Terry Cooke, Founding Director of the China Partnership of Greater Philadelphia.

Stay tuned for more!

Note 1:  If you want to be sure you see each of these upcoming posts reliably and promptly, please click the “Follow” button on the WordPress toolbar immediately above this blog’s heading and an email will automatically be sent to you as soon as each post appears.

Note 2:   See   Brookings Backgrounder  for additional information on:  (1) the Brookings Institution’s Metropolitan Policy Program initaitive for clean energy clusters; (2) the intellectual antecedents of this policy work in the work of Michael Porter at Harvard University; and (3) how David Sandalow and Brookings helped translated this thinking into U.S. Government policy through the closely-connected Energy Innovation Hub (EIH) program and the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) program (via the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings).

Note 3: If you want to help push for Philadelphia’s emergence as a 21st century clean energy leader, please tweet or Like on Facebook or +1 this on G+, using the sharing tool below.  Thanks.

The surest way of knowing where the Chinese national government wants to go is to follow the money they put into mega-projects.

The development of Shenzhen and Pudong over the 6th – 9th Five Year Plans (FYP) showed the government’s attitude toward market-opening in the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, the Binhai project in Tianjin likewise demonstrates the central government’s commitment to clean energy development  and the China Medical Center in Jiangsu demonstrates their interest in advanced health technologies to combat cancer and other diseases affecting an aging population.

Cloud Computing is high on the government’s to-do list. Beijing is reported to have committed more than US$150 million (RMB 1 billion) to develop a 10 square kilometer “‘cloud computing’ Special Administrative Region (SAR)” for high-tech and start-up firms in the south-western city of Chongqing. Although the initial financial ante is modest, the stakes being played for are high.   Importantly, the cloud computing SAR will reportedly be exempted from the the country’s strict system of internet censorship control, known affectionately as  “The Great Firewall (GFW).”

For the issue of how Beijing’s central Five Year planning process translates to mega-projects, I try to tackle this in my book in the chapter called “Managing Hyper-Growth.”.

I was asked today what accounts for China’s outsized role in solar PV , amounting currently to roughly 50% of global share of production despite having a Lilliputian share of global consumption.  It comes down to three inconvenient truths.   That said, the degree of inconvenience of each truth varies with the point of view (e.g., ‘panda hugger’ vs ‘dragon slayer’ in the U.S. vs  ‘patriotic netizen’ in China) of who you happen to be talking with :

(1) Post-WWII, Asia (and notably China since 1982) has had clear advantages of cheaper land, cheaper labor and cheaper facilities relative to manufacturers in higher per capita income markets in the West. Since solar panel production has some basic similarities to the manufacturing process for computer memory chips (which in the 1990s were the basic ‘rice’ commodity of the IT boom in Asia), solar manufacturing has benefited from the natural ‘cluster effect’ of decades of chip manufacturing know-how of Chinese, Taiwanese and other investors on the mainland.

(2) The barriers to entry for solar manufacturers are lower than the earlier tech waves of integrated circuits and bio-technologies so national and local
government in China has seized on it to bootstrap their economies to a higher rung of the global value chain. This has meant various government subsidies (on the producer side) to the point of a casino mentality — more than 100 solar manufacturers in the single town of Dezhou in Shandong Province. (The Chinese government also rounded up and ramped up polysilicon supply when that key input for solar PV production tightened in 2010/11);

(3) There’s not yet an established market for solar products in China so almost everything is exported to Western markets — especially to those national
markets like Germany and Spain and state markets in the U.S. such as New Jersey that have been subsidizing the industry (on the consumer side). [Note: World Trade Organization rules tend to allow/encourage consumer-side subsidies and to sanction producer-side subsidies, hence the recent trade action by the 7 Western solar firms against China. However, these actions take time to work their way through the ‘python’ of WTO process).

As a wrote almost a year ago ( click here for link ), there’s a global boom/bust going on in PV solar and China is in the thick of it.

Premise

Participation in China’s fast-growing nuclear market offers promise and peril for global market-leaders.  A model coupling U.S. innovation with Chinese scale and speed of deployment offers the best path forward.

Discussion

The development of China’s nuclear market has been driven by a governmental elite, many of whom were trained as engineers. Their strategic thinking appears to be motivated in part by the challenges of climate change – to adopt lower carbon sources of electricity generation. As the vice president of the China Nuclear Energy Association has pointed out, nuclear power – rather than solar, wind or biomass – is “the only energy source that can be used on a mass scale” to achieve clean, low-carbon energy.

Just as significantly, though, China’s rapid expansion of nuclear power appears motivated by a desire to upgrade the Chinese nuclear industry by enticing foreign suppliers who want to participate in China’s market growth to share their technology with Chinese partners. The profit potential is vast in China, but other big emerging economies, such as India and Brazil, will be exploring nuclear installations in coming decades. To wrest some of that business away from established incumbents –such as France’s Areva and Japan’s Westinghouse – China is leveraging its low-cost labor and deep experience with major infrastructure projects. A Western-designed reactor can be built in China for 40% less cost and 36% faster than that same installation in Europe.

For China to become globally competitive its two major nuclear power companies — China National Nuclear Corporation and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group — will need to improve in the knowledge-intensive end of the business. Of the 13 nuclear power plants currently operating in China, only three — all at the Qinshan site — rely on an indigenously developed design. Likewise, China has only limited experience selling its reactors in export markets; Pakistan is the only known foreign buyer to date. Finally, to compete globally, China will need to manufacture specialized components, for which it is currently dependent on foreign suppliers.

As for U.S.-China strategic cooperation in the nuclear field, there have been important undertakings but, to date the governments have not attempted anything on a broad strategic basis. There are interesting opportunities on the horizon. Former U.S. Ambassador to China, Jon M. Huntsman Jr., has reported discussing with Bill Gates a new kind of reactor “that runs for decades on a single fuel load, making and destroying plutonium as it runs,” thereby reducing the hazards of reprocessing and the dangers of proliferation. According to Huntsman, strategic cooperation between the U.S. and China to develop this American-pioneered technology could bring shared benefits. The technology could, for example, be certified and brought to commercial scale faster in China. A partnership effort could be envisioned where a joint American-Chinese company leads the construction, with co-development and commercialization rights apportioned between the partners. The end-result could be a cleaner and (marginally) safer form of energy brought to consumers quickly and at scale.

(This piece has been reprinted from G+ Insights, a publication series of the Gerson Lehrman Group at www.gplus.com.  The G+ piece, in turn, has been adapted from Sustaining U.S.-China Cooperation in Clean Energy,  a book publication authored by Terry Cooke forthcoming from the Kissinger Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Institute in November 2011).

I was asked during the UNEP Symposium in Philadelphia yesterday how I thought shale gas and ‘tight gas’ projects — which are at an early stage of operation in various parts of the world such as the United States, China  and Argentina — may affect the development of existing renewable energy sources, such as geothermal, biomass, wind, solar, tidal.

There are different dynamics in advanced economies versus emerging economies as each responds to the shale gas opportunity.

In the advanced economies, the values framework for evaluating shale gas tends to emphasize the environment at the expense of economics.  This is the so-called “3 C’s” orientation of carbon and climate change.  Under this framework, shale and tight gas are only somewhat less carbon-intensive in comparison with traditional fossil fuel sources and their extraction entails media-ampliflied but not yet proven environmental risks associated with ‘fracking’ et cetera.

In the developing world, the tendency is instead to focus on economic and energy security benefits — the “3 E’s” of economics and energy exploitation.  From this viewpoint, the positives of shale gas — a relatively cheap and abundant and lower carbon energy source for a country like China — far outweigh negatives of as yet unproven environmental risk.  In any case, under the Chinese framework of development, industrial growth and wealth creation come first, and clean-up from the environmental impacts of fast growth come later.

The hard truth is that these the viewpoints in North America and East Asia should not be so divergent.  In a world of finite resources and global pollution, we can ill afford to be seeing different problems and talking past one another.  The common denominator and linchpin is long-term energy efficiency .  Efficient energy utilization is environmental stewardship at the same time that it is good business and the basis for good economic policy.  Efficient and diversified energy utilization promotes jobs, investment and a sustainable environment.  Neither the advanced world nor the developing world should be sequencing energy and environmental policy or prioritizing between them.  Both the U.S. and China could be pursuing a common approach, based on energy efficiency and designed to yield both economic and environmental benefits simultaneously.

By splitting the difference between the “3 C’s” and the ‘3 E’s” both countries could reframe the challenge as the “3  D’s” of diversified energy sources, dollar-accountability, and developmental sustainability. And by re-framing objectives on a realistic and common basis, strategic efforts such as the U.S.-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative may be able to get better global traction.

In the real world, it’s not shale gas versus renewables.  It’s shale gas and renewables balanced together for economic and environmental sustainability.

The following post was co-authored by Shawn Lesser (Watershed Capital Group) and me and appeared initially on the Cleantechies blog:

A number of the cleantech efforts between the United States and China reflect the need for cooperation on issues surrounding climate change and clean energy as it is a major factor in the relations of these two countries. Although there are still issues to resolve in many of the collaborations, it is believed that if the United States and China can continue in their cleantech collaborations, that it will show the world that two major players on the international platform are serious about combating the challenge of climate change, and it will also encourage other countries to create alliances. Through collaboration, the two largest greenhouse gas emitters will be able to create technologies required to combat climate change. Not only that, but tangible benefits will be developed, not just for the United States and China, but the world as a whole.

1) United States – China Ten Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and Environment was established in 2008, and it “facilitates the exchange of information and best practices to foster innovation and develop solutions to the pressing environment and energy challenges both countries face.” It also led to the creation of “EcoPartnerships” – a way to encourage both United States and Chinese stakeholders to strengthen their commitment to sustainable economic development within the local level.

2) United States – China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) has its main headquarters in both countries. It will facilitate research and development of technology by a team of leading scientists and engineers in the clean technology industry. The research center receives both private and public funding which is split evenly for each country. The initial research priorities of the United States – China Clean Energy Research Center includes building energy efficiency, clean vehicles, and clean coal, which includes carbon capture and storage. It was founded in 2009 by United States President Barak Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao. The goal of the research center is to “build a foundation of knowledge, technologies, human capabilities, and relationships in mutually beneficial areas that will position the United States and China for a future with very low energy intensity and highly efficient multi-family residential and commercial buildings.”

3) United States – China Energy-Efficient Buildings (CERC-EEB) Action Plan enables the United States and China to work alongside the private sector in an effort to develop energy efficient rating systems and building codes, benchmark industry energy efficiency, provide training to building inspectors as well as energy efficiency auditors at industrial facilities, synchronize test procedures and performance metrics for consumer products that are energy efficient, exchange energy efficient labeling systems best practices, and assemble a new annual United States – China Energy Efficiency Forum. The action plan will be achieved through green building and communities, industrial energy efficiency, consumer products standards, advanced energy efficiency technology, and public and private engagement.

4) United States – China Electric Vehicles (CERC-EV) Initiative builds upon the previous United States – China Electric Vehicle Forum which was held in 2009. The initiative comes from the shared interest in increasing the utilization of electric vehicles to decrease oil dependence and greenhouse gas emissions, while promoting viable economic growth. This initiative includes a joint standard in development, demonstration projects in multiple cities in each country, technical road mapping, as well as projects to provide the public with more information.

5) 21st Century Coal Program (CERC-ACTV) promotes a cleaner use of coal resources, such as large-scale carbon capture and storage projects. The program calls for collaboration between a number of companies in the United States, including General Electric, AES, and Peabody Energy, which will be working with a number of Chinese companies to develop an integrated gasification combined cycle power plants, methane capture, as well as a number of other technologies.

6) China Greentech Initiative was founded in 2008 and has rapidly grown to become the only China-international collaboration platform of 100+ organizations, focused on identifying, developing and promoting green technology solutions in China. CGTI released its first free public deliverable, The China Greentech Report at the World Economic Forum in Dalian, China in 2009. With over 50,000 copies in use, the report is commonly referred to as the ‘primer’ by which to understand China’s greentech markets.

7) United States Alliances in Chinese Cleantech Industry includes the availability of a number of United States cleantech companies to invest into the Chinese cleantech industry. Currently, many companies from the United States are finding opportunities through alliances and cleantech and capital technology transfer investments. This leads to an increase in opportunities to assist cleantech into becoming one of the largest industries on a global platform. There has been much in the way of cross-border collaboration in many cleantech sectors, including solar and wind generation, water technologies, smart grid infrastructures, and electric transportation.

8 ) United States – China Renewable Energy Partnership develops roadmaps for widespread and continual renewable energy research, development and deployment in the United States and China, including renewable energy road mapping, regional deployment solutions, grid modernization, advanced renewable energy technology research and development collaboration in advanced biofuels, wind, and solar technologies, and public-private engagement to promote renewable energy and expand bilateral trade and investment via a new United States – China Renewable Energy Forum held annually. In connection with the U.S.-China Renewable Energy Partnership, another important area of U.S.-China cooperation is the Shale Gas Initiative.

9) United States – China Energy Cooperation Program describes itself as the only non-governmental organization that focuses on the United States – China business development within the clean energy sector. The partnership’s purpose is to “promote commercially viable project development work in clean energy and energy efficiency, and support the sustainable development of the energy sectors in both countries.” It was founded in Beijing in 2009, initiative by the United States commercial sector, and provides a vehicle allowing companies from both countries to work together and pursue clean sector market opportunities, address any trade impediments, and increase sustainable development.

10) Key U.S.-China Regional Cooperation Initiatives. An important layer of ‘connectivity’ in the U.S.-China clean energy business landscape is provided by long-standing, regionally-based cooperative initiatives. Top among these are the U.S.-China Green Energy Council (based in the Bay Area), the U.S.-China Clean Energy Forum (based in Greater Seattle with a Washington DC presence), and the Joint U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy (based in Beijing, Shanghai and Washington DC).

Article by Shawn Lesser & Terry Cooke.

Shawn is president and founder of Atlanta-based Sustainable World Capital, which is focused on fund-raising for private equity cleantech/sustainable funds, as well as private cleantech companies and M&A. He is also a co- founder of the Global Cleantech Cluster Association (GCCA), and can be reached at shawn.lesser@sworldcap.com

Terry Cooke is Strategic Advisor for Global Partnerships for the Global Cleantech Cluster Association (GCCA).  He is also a 2010 Public Policy Scholar on U.S.-China Clean Energy at the Woodrow Wilson Center and author of the forthcoming Sustaining U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation being published by the Kissinger Institute of the Wooldrow Wilson Center.   His website is www.terrycooke.com .


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