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China’s Ukraine crisis mediator Li Hui wrapped up his two-day visit to Kyiv yesterday. He is now headed to Poland, France, Germany and Russia. What should we expect? With Poland, he will likely make the case that Poland’s serving as the primary conduit for NATO arms into Ukraine hurts prospects for peace and that Poland should emulate China’s “restraint” in not supplying arms to either side. In France, Li will repeat the Macron’s refrain — music to the Chinese Communist Party’s ears — that France aligns with China in seeking a cessation of violence in Ukraine and doesn’t think that Taiwan figures prominently in Europe’s “strategic autonomy” calculations (a tune which was widely repudiated throughout the EU shortly after Macron riffed on it in Beijing last month). In Germany, the message will be stern Chinese disapproval and “hurt feelings” over the US $2.97 billion (€2.7 billion) military aid package just announced by Germany’s Ministry of Defense late last week. The final stop in Russia will be to debrief Foreign Minister Lavrov (and possibly Putin himself?) over what Li learned from this diplomatic circuit.
When Beijing announced its twelve-point PRC Position on the Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis last February, coinciding with the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, I was immediately skeptical. In 1% Words, 99% Work and in a subsequent Q&A post, I laid out the reasons for my skepticism. I have been often asked since then if I remain equally dismissive and, if so, why. On the first point: Yes, with a single qualification (see below), I remain dismissive. As to why, the question is where to begin?
While China is presenting itself on the global stage as a potential mediator, it is definitional that a mediator needs credibility on both sides to play a meaningful role. Notwithstanding Zelensky’s eagerness to talk with Xi and SecState Blinken’s recent suggestion that China could have some useful role to play in an eventual cessation of hostilities, China has zero credibility as a mediator:
- Its twelve-point plan is entirely contradictory with respect to Ukraine’s sovereignty and, by freezing in place territorial gains by Russia over the past year, would reward Russia for its invasion
- China has consistently propped up Russia over the past fifteen months by every means available short of supplying lethal military armaments (and, with its export of dual-use drones, has leaned over that line)
- Xi’s appointed “mediator” to help resolve the conflict, Li Hui, previously served for six years as China’s ambassador to Russia
- I could go on at length but, since a picture can be worth 1,000 words, let me simply share one graphic depicting China’s G7 voting record on Ukraine-related measures over the past year and a quarter. It speaks for itself:
So what about the caveat I mentioned above? Since it’s clear that China can’t be a good faith mediator, Xi has a different gambit disguised under his pose as a potential mediator. He is positioning China in Putin’s corner so that, at some future point, he can come to the center of the ring as counterpart and interlocutor with the U.S. and most of Europe coming out from Ukraine’s corner. In Xi’s worldview, China and the U.S. should bargain — as equal powers — over the heads of Zelensky and the Ukrainian people. For Xi, this positioning serves China either way — if it happens, it confirms China’s role on the world stage as a counterweight and as an equal to the U.S. If it doesn’t happen, the U.S. remains mired in its Ukraine engagement, freeing up China to advance its interests in the Mid-East and elsewhere with reduced U.S. pushback.
What eludes Xi’s vision and grasp is the ultimate strength and source of legitimacy of democratic authority. What he is failing to understand is that the U.S. and the community of European nations will not barter away Zelensky’s and the Ukrainian people’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The end result will be no meaningful mediation and no cessation of hostilities short of a decisive military resolution on the ground. Seen in this light, China’s role is hardly that of a mediator. Xi will advance China’s interest in keeping the U.S. tied up in Europe by confusing the global picture, continuing to prop up Russia by all available means and prolonging the conflict with little concern for the welfare of the Ukrainian people.
Xi Jinping arrived in Moscow yesterday for the start of a three-day state visit, his first trip overseas since securing his unprecedented third-five year term as head of the party and president of the country. Yesterday’s meeting was heavy with symbolism — the two leaders exchanged greetings and expression of friendship seated together intimately in front of a fireplace — but devoid of substance. The first solid indication of the substantive direction their talks are taking will happen in a few hours during a press event scheduled to take place prior to their formal dinner. That direction will be further mapped out at the conclusion of the state visit tomorrow immediately prior to the departure from Moscow of Xi Jinping and his delegation.
These meetings are being closely watched because they will reveal which of three starkly different paths the two leaders will choose.
Behind Door Number 1 is the possibility that Xi will show determination to be the peace-broker he postured as with the release of his PRC Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis 12-point plan late last month. This would mean exerting real pressure to overcome the mutually-incompatible public positions of Russia (i.e., that no negotiations are possible until Ukraine formally cedes those territories in eastern Ukraine which Russia currently occupies) and of Ukraine (i.e., that no negotiations are possible until Russia completely relinquishes all territories it has occupied since Russia’s 2022 invasion and possibly also the Crimean territories seized in 2014 though there is not clarity on that latter point). There is no question that Xi has the means to move Putin in this direction if he should choose to. It would suffice for Xi to threaten to drastically reduce purchase of Russian oil, to limit export of Chinese microchips and other vital but non-lethal supplies which prop up Putin’s war effort, and to distance himself from Putin on the world stage. The reason this door will stay closed, though, is two-fold. First, Xi has no means available to bring Kyiv along in this direction. Xi’s platitudes about the cessation of hostilities and entering into talks is an absolute non-starter for Zelensky and his committed backers in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere. It would simply freeze Russian gains in place and allow Moscow’s forces time to regroup. Nor does Xi have any realistic standing to leverage world opinion to pressure Zelensky to move in a direction he’s dead-set against. Even for Brazil, Hungary, India, Indonesia and the other influential fence-sitters, what Beijing has been doing over the past year (supporting Russia in myriad ways right up to the red-line of supplying lethal equipment) outweighs what it has recently been saying about weighing in as a mediator and potential peace-broker. Beijing had not yet even opened up a channel of communication with Kyiv until a few days ago and that only at the Foreign Minister level. Yes, the U.S. and its allies have been loudly supportive of Xi reaching out to Zelensky but that is not because they see that as a step toward a PRC-brokered ceasefire. They’re advocating this because they know how passionately persuasive Zelensky can be about Ukraine’s position on the right side of history and hope that direct communication with Zelensky would give Xi further pause in any consideration of supplying Russia with lethal armaments.
Behind Door Number 2 is the possibility that Xi and Putin will use their time behind closed doors to hammer out an agreement through which China bolsters Moscow’s faltering war effort with a meaningful level, either quantitatively or qualitatively, of lethal munitions. This represents the ‘red line’ which SecState Blinken has been publicly warning Xi to back off from in recent weeks. It would represent a watershed development for two reasons. First, it would prove beyond argument the hollowness of Beijing’s posture of neutrality. Short of such military supply, Beijing has already deployed all the tools at its disposal to help Moscow — using its manufacturing strength to supply the Russian military with dual-use technologies, using its economy to shore up the vital Russian energy sector, using its currency to help prop up the ruble, using its propaganda organs to parrot Moscow’s line on the causes of the war and even its Special Military Operation terminology, using its diplomacy to provide Putin (fresh from the International Criminal Court in the Hague issuing an arrest warrant for him) with ‘diplomatic cover.’ Second, Russia’s supply of military-use drones, ammunition, and artillery has the potential to significantly change the battlefield. Perhaps not to the degree to allow the poorly-performing Russian military to realize its maximalist territorial objectives; but definitely enough to prolong the military see-saw and reenergize Putin’s strategy of outlasting the fractious democracies supporting Ukraine. Should Xi accede to this course of action behind closed doors, it would not remain a secret for any length of time. Beyond the ability of the U.S. intelligence community to pick up on this new move through monitoring communications — both PRC internal communications and government-to-industry communications — the appearance of Chinese armaments on the battlefield would be instantly recognized and highlighted by the Ukrainian military. The consequences would be immediate and disastrous for China’s wobbly economic recovery. Sanctions from the U.S. and Europe — China’s two largest trading markets — could conceivably be enough to knock 1-2% off China’s economic growth in 2023. Under that scenario, China’s GDP growth would fall to 3% or under for three of the last four years. Such a prolonged period of low growth could well mean that China never manages the leap which Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have previously managed from being a manufacturing labor-led economy to being an innovation-led developed economy. Being consigned to this so-called “middle income trap” while simultaneously being trapped in demographic collapse would, quite simply, mean the end of Xi’s vision of national rejuvenation. More precariously for Xi, it would mean an end to the 100 Years Long March which Xi’s predecessors and compatriots in the Chinese Communist Party have been journeying on since 1949 (and even before). Xi understands this and Door 2 will not be flung open.
That leaves Door 3. This is the path of steady-as-she-goes with all of its inherent contradictions and all of its incremental pluses-and-minuses. Xi is determined to strike certain poses on the world stage and those may now be spotlighted and amplified: the posture of exaggerated friendship and increasing fraternization with a former Communist super-power is essential to the realization of the ‘Big Power’ role which Xi has set for China in his third term as well as for the ballast which it provides Xi in projecting himself as leader of an alternative to the liberal, U.S.-led, post-WW2 order. At a symbolic level, Xi can continue to ratchet up this image for a global audience, as he is doing currently with this visit to Moscow. At the level of practice, however, Xi cannot afford to risk further blows to China’s economy. He will refrain from taking any decisive step towards arming Moscow. In so doing, he will doubtless look for additional ways to support Putin’s war effort at the margins while forestalling any large-scale economic retaliation from the U.S. and other global Ukraine coalition countries.. This symbolism-heavy, practical-action-light approach follows the game-plan which Xi successfully ran with the militarization of the islands and reefs in the South and East China Seas. Taking a series of small steps, each of which was just below the threshold of triggering a forceful reaction from the U.S. and its allies, but which cumulatively over time secured the strategic objective he was seeking. The “boil a frog slowly’ strategy. Just as importantly, it is strongly in Xi’s interest that Russia not suffer sudden defeat and “disappear” from the global stage. Xi’s interest is for Russia’s to remain on stage but moving gradually away from center-stage to make room for China’s more prominent presence there. This shift is already well underway as China, on a daily basis, gains increasing control over Russia’s energy market, its financial sector, its diplomacy and its geopolitical positioning vis-a-vis Siberia and the Russian East.
My prediction for what will unfold later today and tomorrow — and then subsequently in the aftermath of Xi’s visit — is the gradual opening of Door Number Three. That is not to say that Xi could not ultimately surprise us. He has proven himself to be a risk-taker — and has gotten off lightly — with both the South & East China Seas militarization and with the Basic Security Law takeover of Hong Kong. Could he open Door Number 2? Yes, possibly. Alternatively, he possibly has something up his sleeve to entice Zelensky into talks with. Is Door Number 1 locked, bolted and sealed shut? No. But there’s no reason to believe that Xi wants to put in the hard work to open that door. Whatever ultimately transpires, though, the prize for Xi lies behind Door Number 3. He is shrewd enough to know that and act on it.
In my network, there’s a lot of interest in — and considerable disagreement over — the meaningfulness of the PRC statement of principles toward resolving the Ukraine crisis released on Friday. I gave my on-the-spot personal view in the post 1% Words, 99% Work on the day of the statement’s release but, since then, I have been fielding comments and questions from a number of friends and associates.
I am going to share here one of those conversations. The questions were posed to me by another college classmate, in this case a person with a lifetime of deep and wide professional experience in China. I hope that these questions and answers might prompt readers of Assessing China to continue to think about this issue in a curiosity-forward and thoughtful way.
Here is the Q&A exchange:
What factual inaccuracies do you find in it (the official PRC Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis)?
- It’s important to note at the outset that this is a position paper (clarifying the PRC’s own position) rather than a peace proposal (aimed at bringing the two warring sides together). With that in mind, the PRC is perfectly entitled to set out their position in any 12 — or any 120 — points which they chose. However, it is also clear that they are using this position paper in order to position themselves to be seen as a potential mediator between the two warring parties. Whether they pull off that positioning exercise depends both on whether the PRC proves ready, willing and able to play that role and whether key parties to the conflict support them playing that role.
- Factual problems are only one dimension of what can be problematic in a document like this. On the factual inaccuracy front, I will limit myself to the very first point. Since 1945, there has been no definition of sovereignity which squares with Russia’s invasion. To this day, China has backed Putin’s language (a special military operation, not a war or invasion) and its worldview (revanchism and restoration by force of past empire are legit). If you can’t get past the first principle, it’s hard to take the rest of the document seriously. For the rest …
- Point 2: A dig at the U.S. An assertion with no real substance.
- Point 3: The question is how and under whose terms: 21st c. norms of forward-looking sovereignity protecting the rights of citizenry developed over the past 75+ years or the Putin/Xi aggrieved, backward-looking version all in the mind of an individual leader with the power to enforce conformity to his — it’s usually a man — viewpoint
- Point 4: We can all hope for peace talks but neither of the warring party appears ready to consider these. They each hope to establish a position of strength before entering into them. Temporary stalemate.
- Point 5: There’s a lot China could do unilaterally on this point. Words are cheap. The U.S and the West have demonstrably done a lot already. China?
- Points 6, 7, 8 & 9: Who has been the responsible party for these specific problems? Hardly a gray area to my mind. Russian summary execution of captured soldiers and civilians in Bukha and other villages they invaded and occupied. Russian forcible evacuations of children to camps in Russia. Russian sustained artillery assaults on the nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhia (not to mention indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure). Russian interdiction of Ukrainian grain exports at ports and railways. What are the comparables from the Ukrainian side? I personally don’t think there are many but, in any case, law always gives special consideration to the responder rather than the initiator, the defender rather than the attacker.
- Point 10: Equivalent to stripping Ukraine of one of the ways which the world community has provided to help them defend themselves.
- Points 11 & 12: We can all agree that these would be desirable
And what’s your view on why U.S hegemony has been good for the world for the last 70 years, despite some of the bad that we did?
- I’ll just offer two points of response
- Providing the world with a longer period of sustained peace — not perfect of course but far better than anything that preceded it — and also more measurable human advancement (educational, health, wealth, human rights) than previously achieved at any point in history
- Providing China with the opportunity, tools and resources to help raise 800 million of their citizens out of poverty
If “U.S. hegemony” is just part of China’s ideology, isn’t “democracy vs. autocracy” part of our ideology?
- I quite agree with you about the “U.S. hegemony” as contrasted with the “autocracy vs democracy” point. There are levels to that though and I focus on the third level:
- Level 1: both terms are established political science terms and describe real things in international behavior
- Level 2: as is their right, both Beijing and Washington choose to amplify the political concept that best suits their purpose
- Level 3: I come down against ceding there is equivalency between the two for two reasons:
- Focus on ‘hegemony’ is rooted in a sense of historical grievance and doesn’t offer the world much unless other players share that grievance and all agree to do something about it. ‘Authoritarianism vs democracy’ draws a clear distinction between two different systems and encourages everyone to think about, and ultimately choose, their preference. Xi is at liberty to assert China offers a superior form of democracy to Western liberal democracy. Not many governments or people around the world seem to buy into that. The U.S. has over 65 formal allies based on shared values rooted in liberal democracy and the post-WWII order. China has one — North Korea — and is working hard at adding Russia and Iran to the list
- There’s no inherent accountability to Xi’s and China’s use of the term hegemon in describing the U.S. Top-down and echoed throughout a propaganda apparatus which can’t be questioned because, as Marxist-Leninist doctrine holds, it definitionally represents what is best for the people. In the Biden Administration’s amplifying of “authoritarianism vs democracy” however, it can be questioned and jettisoned come January 2025 if that is the will of the majority of Americans.
Washington had been urging China since the beginning of Russia’s war to play some role in peace negotiations, and now it has offered to do so, outlining the basic principles. I think that’s a good thing. The U.S. cannot be an honest broker, nor can any country in NATO. Perhaps China could pay a useful role in stopping the fighting.
- I think what the U.S. has been urging China is (1) aspirationally, to encourage China to come down from fence-sitting and use its suasion with Moscow to promote post-WWII norms of sovereignity (versus might makes right) but (2) more importantly not to aid and abet the instigator in this war of choice with sanctions-cushioning actions and (c) definitely, definitely not with sanctions-evading support and supply of lethal munitions. China has chosen to completely reject (1) and (2) and, as for (3), is in advanced negotiation with Russia to set pricing and scale of supply for offensive drones and ammunition, possibly also artillery.
- The U.S. and NATO don’t offer themselves or pretend to be honest brokers. They have clearly taken the side and will continue to take the side of Ukraine since Feb 24, 2022. The fundamental problem is that China is trying to have its cake and eat it too — on the one hand, giving consistent, significant and now increasing levels of support for Russia over the past twelve months while also now posturing with this position paper as a potential honest broker. I share your hopes and think its good that Zelinsky will meet with Xi. I just don’t expect that, in the final analysis, much will come of it for the reasons outlined above.
My concluding comment: I commend this interlocutor for asking thoughtful and useful questions. Many of the exchanges I had were with people who wanted to convince me that their interpretation of the situation was the correct one. One of the common denominators of those perspectives seems rooted in fear … fear of the Ukraine crisis spilling over into nuclear strikes, fear of the U.S. government missing a chance to work with China to resolve the situation, fear of the U.S. finding itself on the wrong side of history as Brazil, Hungary, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Africa, India and Indonesia gravitate into a Chinese orbit. I personally do not share those fears. In fact, I believe that the surest way of avoiding any of those scenarios becoming even plausible is for us to lose the clear-sightedness and the bedrock values which have guided our reaction to Russia and China since February 24, 2021.
The SARS-COV-19 outbreak was first detected almost exactly three years ago in Wuhan. In large part because of PRC Government obfuscation and delay, the world was caught off-balance in ensuing months. We all know the toll in human lives and suffering that has followed.
For democratic-leaning, economically-advanced societies, the road back to a semblance of “normalcy” has been long and difficult but citizens in these countries are now embracing their return to “the new normal.” For less developed countries in the Global South, the journey has been even more arduous and painful due to constrained resources (though, interestingly, the genetic stock of African nations seems to have insulated many of their populations from the worst of Covid-19’s virulence). It is only in China — and perhaps also in North Korea but who knows what has been happening there — that the experience has been dramatically different. Xi Jinping’s “steadfast” policy of Zero Covid — and, subsequently, Dynamic Zero Covid — has resulted in coercive lockdowns of as much as 20% of the country’s population at a given time and in an ineffective vaccination program weakened by hostility to foreign-made mRNA vaccines and propaganda-induced vaccine-hesitancy among its elderly. Today, only 40% of the most vulnerable segment of Chinese seniors — those over 80 — have received two doses and a booster of the Chinese-made vaccine, a combination which has been shown to be no more effective than two doses (without booster) of the Moderna, Pfizer and comparable Western-developed vaccines.
The crippling effects of Xi’s Zero Covid and Dynamic Zero Covid policies on China’s economic performance, coupled with the unprecedented nation-wide protests against the lockdowns flaring up in late November prompted the PRC Government to suddenly drop the policies — and, in fact, any mention of these policies — in early December. As well documented in front-page reporting in today’s New York Times (After Scuttling ‘Zero Covid,’ Xi Offers No Plan), this about-face is potentially catastrophic in its suddeness: the PRC government has not readied any robust vaccination or even public education program to fill the vacuum left in the wake of Zero Covid, reliable data about infections is no longer available since government-mandated mass-testing has been dropped and people are being told to self-test at home, and Xi Jinping is nowhere to be seen, having snuck out the back door of the monument to his infallibility and PRC governmental superiority he built around his Zero Covid policy.
Xi’s Zero Covid policy has clearly boomeranged on him — and, more tragically, on the Chinese people:
- Projections of more than a million infections in coming weeks
- ICUs and hospitals already overwhelmed
- Morgues and crematoria backlogged and corpses stacked in plain view (despite PRC Govt acknowledging zero deaths)
But does the boomerang effect end there? Despite today’s excellent reporting by the Times and recent reporting by other news outlets, the scope of what is happening in China is only dimly understood outside of China. In large part, this is due to the fact that the scope is not well understood in China — except anecdotally and in felt individual experience — due to the heavy curtain of state-media censorship. The scope may be vast …
There are many reasons we should be attending closely to these developments. Humanity and empathy are high among those reasons. But perhaps the most important reason is that this could all come back and boomerang on us again, too. Unchecked spread among a vast, poorly-protected population can easily give rise to a new strain in China that could once again spread throughout the world.
What goes around, comes around. Wuhan Redux? If so, the finger of blame is to be pointed directly at Xi Jinping.
Experts predicting COVID cases in China to explode after the country ends strict zero-COVID policy (USA Today, 6 hours ago)
Scientists predict COVID surge in China this winter, with hundreds of millions of people infected (NPR, 1 day ago)
Strain on China’s hospitals may now be resulting in doctors and nurses infecting patients (BBC, 2 days ago)
Today’s post shares excellent analyses of the on-going protests in China courtesy of Foreign Affairs:
Across China, people are protesting the country’s strict “zero COVID” policy, in a rare show of dissent against President Xi Jinping’s regime and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The wave of outrage started after a deadly fire in the city of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang region, killed at least 10 people on November 24. The city has been under lockdown for more than 100 days. Protesters are calling for an end to the zero-COVID policy—but also for greater democracy and even the removal of Xi.
As Yanzhong Huang writes, it has been clear for some time that Xi’s commitment to zero COVID is a risky move. “Having staked enormous political capital on zero COVID,” Chinese officials have had to pursue “excessively harsh measures in an effort to avoid any outbreaks that might embarrass the government.” But “Beijing’s intransigence has come at an escalating cost.”
What could mounting public distrust and discontent mean for Xi’s regime? The country’s punishing lockdowns “could contain the seeds of future political transformation,” Huang writes. If the Chinese government refuses to alter course, it could face a serious crisis of legitimacy. And Xi’s power is already being questioned as never before, Chinese dissident Cai Xia notes. Despite Xi’s outward projection of confidence, his popularity is slipping—while “in the shadows, resentment among CCP elites is rising.” As demonstrators clash with Chinese authorities across the country, we’ve compiled some of the best recent coverage in Foreign Affairs on how China’s zero-COVID policy is putting the country’s political stability at risk—and what it could mean for Xi and his grip on power. Start reading below.
I am frequently asked questions about Covid in China. The three most commonly posed questions are: (1) how and where did it originate; (2) how is Xi’s Zero-Covid policy faring and (3) what is the reaction in China among both businesspeople and ordinary citizens.
In this post, I’ll take on the first two questions but with the caveat that definitive answers to any of the three questions are almost impossible to arrive at given the complexity of the underlying facts and the fierce political skirmishing over establishing the “truth” of the matter.
I am going to stay above the fray and offer simple generalizations to put each of the first two questions into clear perspective and revealing context. On the second question, I will add substantial commentary from today’s edition of Sinocism by Bill Bishop, which has been well described as “the Presidential Daily Brief for China hands” by Evan Osnos of the New York Times. (Note: Bill Bishop gives his subscribers leave to share, on occasion, content from his newsletter which I am doing for the first time here). For anyone interested in the answer to the third question, I’d say for now that both the business response and popular response is dismal at best but would encourage you to keep an eye out for my fuller response coming soon.
Origins of Covid-19
I am not going to venture where even leading epidemiologists fear to tread but will confine myself to one unassailable truth. The Chinese Government has consistently and systematically denied the world community — both its cadre of scientists and its relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations — access to the sites, data and interviews which would facilitate pinpointing the origins of Covid-19. It may eventually be possible through painstaking DNA regression analysis to pinpoint the origin of Covid-19 with certainty despite this lack of Chinese cooperation. Meanwhile, the glaringly obvious question raised by China’s stance is what is the PRC government trying to hide?
Zero-Covid Thought Control
Ever since Xi Jinping held forth his Zero-Covid policy as the basis for claiming the superiority of “Chinese democracy” over traditional liberal democracy, his adherence to that policy has been “unflinching” and “unswerving.” This was especially apparent in the run-up to the 20th National Party Congress in Beijing last month, even in the face of plummeting economic performance. Emerging from that once-in-five-years leadership shakeup with a plalanx of Standing Committee loyalists in place, Xi acknowledged the economic fall-out and popular discontent by announcing on November 11th some tweaks to enforcement policies under the banner of “optimizing Zero-Covid.” The results of this ‘optimization?’ Today’s infection rate and number of partial lockdowns is, in toto, more widespread and deleterious (see below) than the earlier, traumatic nadir experienced during the Shanghai lockdown last spring. It is ironic, but not altogether surprising, that “the Emperor” insists, as a sop to his pride, that his citizens all change the way they talk and think about his Zero-Covid policy — now “optimized” — rather than that he change the policy meaningfully to ease their personal and economic lives.
Addendum: Extracts from today’s edition of Sinocism on ‘optimized Zero-Covid’
Lockdowns by another name continue in parts of several cities as daily cases are approaching the level of the Shanghai disaster earlier this year. Right now it feels like we are seeing a repeat of Shanghai in late March, when local officials tried targeted and precise measures, before realizing that Omicron overwhelms all those efforts, leaving officials with the choice between letting it start to rip or instituting suffocating lockdowns. Near term I think they will have to choose the latter as they are not where they need to be with vaccinations and hospital capacity. But even then they have a massive problem with virgin immunity, so until they are willing to tolerate larger numbers of serious illness and death, or have better therapeutics, I do not think there is a specific end date. I know it is popular now to say March, pegged to the “two meetings”, but I am not sure why that is really an end date. They really seem stuck.
China lockdowns reach record level as coronavirus cases spiral | Financial Times $$
“China is seeing a record level of lockdowns,” said Ting Lu, chief China economist at Nomura. “It’s even a bit worse than during the [spring] Shanghai lockdown because so many cities are partially locked down.”
The bank estimates Covid restrictions have hit areas responsible for one-fifth of China’s gross domestic product…
In Chongqing, another pandemic hotspot, the arrival on Monday of Sun Chunlan, a vice-premier known for her draconian approach to battling the pandemic, led to widespread panic shopping among residents, concerned about the potential for a tough Shanghai-style lockdown.
China’s Lockdowns Surge in Week Since Covid Policy Adjusted – Bloomberg
China’s top health officials vowed to stick with Covid Zero at a Tuesday briefing, saying outbreaks across the board remain “severe and complex.” Beijing is telling local governments to implement the updated guidelines, which were outlined in 20 measures earlier this month. Localities shouldn’t be excessive when it comes to Covid controls, but they also shouldn’t loosen too much either, said Mi Feng, spokesperson of the National Health Commission.
Beiijng Daily – 尹力：坚定坚决打赢疫情防控整体战阻击战歼灭战 实现防住疫情稳住经济安全发展-千龙网·中国首都网
Party Secretary Yin Li: Yin Li: Firmly and resolutely win the overall war of epidemic prevention and control, the war of resistance and annihilation, realize the prevention of epidemic situation and stabilize the development of economic security.
Comment: “歼灭战”, literally “war/battle of annihilation” seems hard to win with piecemeal shutdowns. Hearing that some beijing cadres issuing localized lockdown orders verbally only not going to inspire confidence in the “optimization” of dynamic zero-Covid on the road to reopening. why are they hiding it? from whom are they trying to hide it?
The ongoing epidemic is witnessing growing infections. The average daily new cases this week reached 22,200, nearly double last week’s level, Hu Xiang, an official of the national epidemic prevention and control bureau, said at a press conference on Tuesday.
Hu noted that the epidemic, which has hit many provinces and regions, showed complex transmission chains. Some provinces are facing the severest and most complicated epidemic in the past three years.
Densely populated cities like Guangzhou in South China’s Guangdong Province and Southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality are epicenters of the ongoing outbreaks, as the large population, high personnel mobility and frequent gatherings in key spots like schools increased the risk of epidemic transmission and the difficulty of putting the epidemic under control, according to Hu…
Citing experts who closely follow the situation of China’s epidemic, some media outlets predicted on Tuesday that this round of the epidemic would continue to expand until the middle of December.
新京报 – 北京疾控：2例重症病例未接种加强针 老人接种率偏低
Beijing official: two seriously ill Beijing patients, one 52 and the other 89, did not get the booster shot and the booster rate for those over 60 is low and for those over 80 is not even 30% 例新冠肺炎重症感染者分别为52岁和89岁，均未接种加强针, 30% 60岁及以上感染者全程和加强免疫接种率均偏低，80岁及以上感染者加强免疫接种率不足30%
新京报 – 24日起进入市属公园等须持48小时内核酸阴性证明
According to the requirements of epidemic prevention and control in Beijing, starting from November 24th, residents and visitors must hold a negative nucleic acid test certificate within 48 hours to visit the municipal parks and the National Botanical Garden.
根据北京市疫情防控工作要求，11月24日起，市民游客进入市属公园、国家植物园参观游览须持48小时内核酸检测阴性证明
China should optimize and adjust its COVID control measures, depending on how the pandemic situation evolves domestically and beyond its borders, a page-one Economic Daily commentary said. Still, it said COVID control is a daunting and long-term endeavor, and that officials must not slack in implementing related measures to contain outbreaks. The pieces quote Xi from his comments to the Wuhan delegation at the delayed NPC meeting in May 2020 – “针尖大的窟窿能漏过斗大的风” – a hole the size of a needlepoint can let in a huge wind”. So how are officials supposed to respond, when they are being reminded that even the slightest slackening can lead to an outbreak? They have seemingly impossible and contradictory tasks
Outbreaks Test China’s Efforts to Limit the Cost of ‘Zero Covid’ – The New York Times
“It’s maybe 10 steps forward and nine steps back,” said Chen Long, a policy analyst at Plenum, a Beijing consulting firm…
Citizens will only be reassured, said Wang Xiangwei, a Beijing commentator and newsletter ( Wang Xiangwei’s Thought of the Day on China) writer, when trusted health experts appear on television to discuss the lack of severity of the Omicron variant for those who have been vaccinated, particularly young people who also have strong immune systems. A possible candidate, he said, was Zhong Nanshan, who helped uncover the SARS outbreak in 2003 and played a key role in drawing national attention to the initial Covid outbreak in Wuhan nearly three years ago.
近期多起疫情涉及高校！教育部本月两度开会部署：防止以“优化”为名放松防控|怀进鹏|教学|无症状感染者例_网易订阅
After several recent outbreaks at colleges and Universities, The the Ministry of Education held two meetings this month to make plans to prevent the relaxation of prevention and control in the name of “optimization”
国家卫健委明确：急诊、透析室、手术室、分娩室、重症监护室非必要不封控
The National Health and Health Commission has made it clear that emergency rooms, dialysis rooms, operating rooms, delivery rooms and intensive care units are not to be shut unless necessary.
The National Health and Health Commission reiterated that it is very important for fever clinics to stay open.
Comment: Officials have really upped the rhetoric on ensuring that people have access to medical care even if there are lockdowns
新华全媒+丨不折不扣落实疫情防控优化措施——国务院联防联控机制新闻发布会回应焦点问题-新华网
Xinhua on the key takeaways from the Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council presser, concludes with:
In the affected areas, medical institutions at risk of the epidemic should not be “shut down” or “locked down” under the pretext of epidemic prevention and control, especially emergency rooms, dialysis rooms, operating rooms, delivery rooms, and intensive care units in medical institutions. These important departments should be “not sealed up and controlled unnecessarily” to ensure the treatment of patients. It is possible to minimize the impact of epidemic prevention and control on the daily medical services of medical institutions and meet the needs of the people for medical treatment.
在发生疫情的地区，不能够以疫情防控为由对发生疫情风险的医疗机构“一关了之”“一封了之”，特别是像医疗机构的急诊、透析室、手术室、分娩室、重症监护室等，这些重要的救治科室要做到“非必要不封控”，保障患者救治。最大可能减少因为疫情防控对医疗机构日常医疗服务的影响，满足人民群众就医需求。
11.22 People’s Daily “Zhong Yin” on epidemic control and prevention work – 深入细致做好服务保障工作
The relationship between epidemic prevention and control, normal production and life, and economic and social development is complementary and dialectically unified. To better respond to and resolve the reasonable demands of the masses and solve the practical difficulties of the people is not only an inherent requirement to adhere to the supremacy of the people and life, but also the right thing to do to firmly implement the general policy of “dynamic zero-Covid”. The struggle against the epidemic in the past three years has profoundly revealed to us that only when the epidemic can be prevented can people’s lives be safe and secure; The only way to effectively coordinate epidemic prevention and control with economic and social development is to take concrete measures to reduce the negative impact of the epidemic and ensure sustained, healthy and stable economic and social development with good results.
疫情防控和正常生产生活、经济社会发展，是相辅相成、辩证统一的关系。更好回应和解决群众合理诉求，解决好人民群众实际困难，这既是坚持人民至上、生命至上的内在要求，也是坚定不移贯彻“动态清零”总方针的题中应有之义。近3年的抗疫斗争深刻启示我们：只有疫情防得住，人民生活才能平平安安；只有抓实抓细疫情防控各项举措，同时减少疫情带来的不利影响，以良好的防控成效保障经济社会持续健康稳定发展，才是高效统筹疫情防控和经济社会发展。
The government also encouraged residents in Chaoyang district to “slow down their lives” at a press conference on Tuesday, asking them to not leave the district unless absolutely necessary, use online learning, online meetings and telephone communications to reduce visits to schools and offices.
CCTV – 上海：24日起，抵沪不满5天者不得进入公共场所_新闻频道_央视网(cctv.com)
Starting 11.24, people who have been in Shanghai for less than 5 days are not allowed to enter public spaces
Chinese regulators warn IPOs of zero-Covid winners subject to tight checks | Financial Times $$
Chinese regulators have warned that a wave of initial public offerings from companies claiming to be involved in China’s booming Covid-19 testing sector will be subject to added scrutiny over concerns that their high growth is unsustainable.
According to Chinese media outlets, a community staff member later suggested that this was a non-official, self-initiated move by the property management and that it has since been corrected.
China Economy Braces for Major Disruption into Next Year as Covid Cases Surge – Bloomberg
The path to reopening “may be slow, painful and bumpy,” the Nomura economists wrote in a note, suggesting a “back and forth” approach as rising cases stir reluctance among policymakers to ease curbs quickly. Nomura forecasts gross domestic product growth of 4.3% for 2023, lower than a median estimate of 4.9% in a Bloomberg survey.
Caixin – China Fleshes Out ‘Optimized’ Covid-19 Response
On Monday, China reported two Covid-related deaths, one in Henan province and one in Sichuan province, after Beijing recorded three virus-related deaths over the weekend.
Beijing shuts parks, museums as China’s Covid-19 cases rise | The Straits Times
The municipality of Tianjin near Beijing on Tuesday became the latest to order citywide testing, after a similar announcement on Sunday by the northern city of Shijiazhuang.
Kevin Rudd, global president of the Asia Society and former Prime Minister of Australia, knows China well. He wrote in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal that:”The 20th Congress, which gets under way Oct. 16th will be different (from other Congresses since the opening of the 1982 reform era). There’s only one appointment that matters now: Xi Jinping, China’s Chairman of Everything. The delegates will reappoint Mr. Xi to a third five-year term as general secretary by a vote of 2,296 to 0.”
I don’t disagree with the main point that Kevin Rudd is making here but there is also a more nuanced view that is important to bring to bear. Wednesday’s post set the table for this more nuanced view. That perspective involves understanding the seven appointments which will be announced on Sunday to the Standing Committee under Xi. The crux of the issue is whether those seven appointments represents a line-up of Xi loyalists — in which case Rudd’s take is spot on — or whether there are appointments enfranchising power-bases at odds with Xi’s direction and indicating that the Party wants some checks on Xi’s untrammeled authority.
Here’s my cheat-sheet to reading next week’s Standing Committee appointments in light of this question:
Chutes & Ladders: 20th CPP National Congress Edition
So what to watch for?
(Scenario 1) Signs that the CCP is totally bought into Xi being Chairman of Everything
— Premier Li Keqiang (aged 67 and therefore normatively eligible for another term) is gone
— No one in their early 50s joins the Standing Committee (showing Xi doesn’t want heir apparent)
— Chen Min’er, a Xi loyalist and champion of Xi’s war on poverty, is appointed
— Ding Xuexiang, a Xi loyalist and Xi policy enforcer, is appointed
(Scenario 2) Signs that the CCP wants some checks on Xi’s untrammeled exercise of power
— He Lifeng, an internationally-friendly protégé of retiring economic czar Liu He, is appointed
— Hu Chunhua, who like Xi had a stellar early career but hasn’t been close with him since, is appointed
— Li Hongzhong, party boss of Tianjin and not “a dyed-in-the-wool” Xi man, is appointed
— Li Xi, party boss of independently minded Guangdong province, is appointed
Finally, keep an eye on Chen Quanguo, party boss of Xinjiang in charge of Uyghur “reeducation,” and Liu Jieyi, head of the Taiwan Affairs Office and the political dimension of the Taiwan reunification project. Whether their stars shine brightly or dim will also give an indication of the degree of CCP support for Xi’s hardline policies on these two fronts.
So that’s the scorecard I recommend you follow. We’ll circle back next week and tally up the score after the Standing Committee line-up has been brought out, in rank order, onto the main stage of the 20th National Party Congress.
With the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) kicking off this coming Sunday, it’s useful to step back from the game of handicapping short-term odds and to take for a moment a longer-term perspective. We can return to anticipating the likely ‘chutes and ladders’ of 20th National Congress outcomes later this week: the (near-certain) likelihood of Xi Jinping securing a third term as President, unprecedented in the post-Mao era, and an examination of the ascendent and dimming stars of various Standing Committee incumbents and candidates and what that portends for the next five years. For now, it’s useful to step back and evaluate how it came to be — and what it means for China’s future — that Xi stands on the threshold of entering the CCP pantheon with near-totalitarian power. The key question to consider is whether Xi managed to bend the CCP and the country to his will or whether Xi’s rise reflects what the CCP has willed for China’s future.
The two best authorities on this question are Elizabeth Economy (The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State [2018] and The World According to China [2022]) and Kerry Brown (Xi: A Study in Power [2022]). Informed by their insights, I will attempt a super-summary of the forty-years which have led up to Sunday’s moment in history and then tackle that key question.
~ ~ ~
The market reforms which the CCP started experimenting with behind the curtain in 1978 and which it then publicly introduced in 1982 had an extraordinary run of success in elevating China’s economy. This occurred first under Deng Xiaoping’s informal leadership from 1982 through 1997 and then continued, in somewhat overlapping fashion with Deng’s tutelage, under the more regularized leadership of, first, Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) and then, starting in 2003, Hu Jintao. By 2007, post-WTO economic reforms were coming on stream, more far-reaching liberalizations were on the horizon, and a new system of divided authority and orderly succession in the Standing Committee was taking shape. (Under this system, the posts of President and Premier as well as the seven (usually) Standing Committee slots could not be held by any one person for more than two five-year slots. If at the time of a National Congress, occurring every five years, a one-term incumbent was 67 years old or less, he (virtually always a ‘he’) would be eligible according to the “seven up, eight down” rule to serve another five year term. If he was 68 or older, however, he would be obliged to step down.)
In 2007, Western observers, myself included, could be forgiven for thinking that China was on a development path in line with Western values and the post-WWII world order. But starting with the Financial Crisis and then, over the next fifteen years, this alignment started to diverge. Progressively, in step with Xi’s anointment as President in 2012 following his leadership struggle with Bo Xilai and his subsequent consolidation of power through his signature “Tigers & Flies” anti-corruption campaign, Xi started positioning his “Rejuvenated” China as deserving equal political stature on the world stage with the United States and equal, if not superior, stature to the West in matters of values and culture. His triumphalist speech at the 2017 National Congress made this claim explicitly and emphatically for all the world to hear. The Belt & Road Initiative and the Zero-COVID policy became Xi’s monumental stages — internationally and domestically — for playing this claim out for all the word to see.
Despite serious setbacks in 2022 with an imploding real estate market and a diminished tech sector, with COVID lockdowns and social discontent, and with the embarassment which his “friend without limits” has caused Xi personally in Ukraine, Xi looks set to enter the CCP pantheon this Sunday to be installed on a pedestal he has made for himself — higher than Deng Xiaoping’s and not lower than Mao Zedong’s.
This enthronement could not have been scripted by one man. The near absolute consolidation of power in the hands of one person could not be the work of one person unless there were far more evidence of resistance and rebellion in the ranks of other CCP power-brokers whose oxen had been gored. As this incisive opinion piece by Kerry Brown in yesterday’s New York Times persuasively argues, Xi’s leadership ethos is the CCP’s ethos and Xi’s laser-focus on making China “strong, respected and feared” will remain as strong even when Xi leaves the stage. It will remain for as long as the CCP can keep the lights on and the stage lit.
by Doug Barry, Senior Director of Communications, U.S.-China Business Council
(view original article in USCBC’s Fifty States, Fifty Stories series)
Policy entrepreneurs are plentiful in America. You can find them everywhere, devoting ideas and energy to getting things done. Terry Cooke founded the non-profit China Partnership of Greater Philadelphia with a focus on getting the United States and China to cooperate on climate change. Getting what he wants done has become more challenging as the two countries ping pong between cooperation, competition, and conflict.
How did he get here and how is he managing multiple challenges simultaneously? He’s been interested in global affairs for a long time, starting in 1988 when he joined the US Commerce Department as a foreign commercial service officer in Shanghai. His two-year posting there bracketed the Tiananmen Square convulsion. Years flew by with postings in Tokyo, Berlin, and Taiwan. In 2002 he took leave from the foreign service and started a consulting business focusing on Taiwan and high tech.
In 2006, Cooke joined the World Economic Forum (WEF) as Director of Asian CEO Partnership with a focus more on Japan than China. He left in 2008. “It was too much travel,” he recalled. “I worked in New York, had my family in Philadelphia, commuted to Geneva, and had responsibility for multiple events in Asia.”
One of the best parts of the WEF job was sitting in on multiple sectoral meetings with CEOs. His main takeaway was that many of these corporate leaders were talking about the challenges of climate change, not as PR or greenwashing, but about the need to transform their companies into low-carbon leaders. “I decided that was the hook that I wanted to hang the second half of my career on when I came back to Philadelphia.”
Cooke recalled his time in Berlin and the impression made by comparing what was then called West Germany with the East, which at the time was terribly polluted. When the Berlin Wall fell, the country united and the cleanup of the Eastern part of the country began. The lesson was that great progress to improve the environment is possible if the political will exists and if clear policy creates predictability for businesses and investors.
The good old days
In 2010, Cooke joined the Wilson Center, a Washington, DC think tank, as senior fellow for US-China climate cooperation. His research there led to publication of his book Sustaining US-China Cooperation in Clean Energy. Coincident with this research, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu introduced a “national labs program for the 21st century” for clean energy technologies as an outgrowth of the 10-year framework for US-China cooperation on energy and the environment pioneered by Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in the waning years of the George W. Bush administration.
President Barack Obama and Secretary Chu worked to expand Paulson’s program, adding three US-China clean energy research centers in different industrial areas: electric vehicles initially at the University of Michigan, clean coal at the University of West Virginia, and energy efficient buildings through a Penn State-led program at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.
“Disappointing as these decisions were, there was still potential in the climate change mitigation space, even as other areas like micro-electronics drifted further off-limits.”
To support and expand the energy-efficient buildings program, Cooke founded in 2011 the China Partnership of Greater Philadelphia whose mission was raising awareness and facilitating collaboration to create and bring to market low-carbon solutions for the built environment. For the first years, things went great with lots of local and Chinese partners, mayoral visits, and stakeholders to plan low-carbon futures for urban centers in the United States and China. In 2014, China Partnership of Greater Philadelphia and its partner organization in China, the TEDA EcoCenter, were competitively selected for and awarded a prestigious U.S.-China EcoPartnership Award, administered jointly by the U.S. and PRC Governments.
“We had some fits and starts, including an unfortunate near-death experience involving IP piracy.” Isn’t this ironic given the long-standing concerns the US government and private sector have about “collaborations” that lead to forced technology transfers and outright pilfering? “It would be if that’s what happened. Instead, the main culprit was an American in an American company.” The company did not want to make a public fuss because of reputational concerns. “We had to shift focus and change our business model to make sure that would never happen again, but it was a one-off, not something endemic with the work we were doing.”
Pulling the plug on energy cooperation
If not as immediately dire, there were other experiences that could have been crippling to his non-profit. Two of them involved former president Donald Trump, who pulled the United States out of the Paris Climate Accords and in 2020 terminated the US-China EcoPartnership program just seven days before leaving office. “Disappointing as these decisions were, there was still potential in the climate change mitigation space, even as other areas like micro-electronics drifted further off-limits.”
The shifting binaries involved with competition and cooperation were making the scope for business cooperation more limited and the non-profit’s work more problematic. Competition is now spilling into the space previously marked by cooperation. The shriveling of discourse between government leaders has only made things more difficult.
“What used to be very effective work through industrial cooperation in lowering emissions is now off the table, though some academic and some intergovernmental climate cooperation continues.”
Early in the Biden administration, excitement was generated by the appointment of John Kerry as climate envoy. Kerry and his PRC counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, had worked closely and cooperatively under Biden’s vice presidency during the Obama administration but Biden administration policy would not be a simple reset to that period. While cooperation continues in areas such as scientific exchange and standards setting, industrial cooperation toward low-carbon goals now enjoys little federal-level support. This even as the planet continues to warm and nations like China and India continue to struggle reducing their addiction to coal.
Kerry recently pointed out in a Foreign Affairs article that there’s still time to avoid disaster but that in the coming years many trillions of dollars will be needed to fund and field clean energy technology. The money, he said, must largely come from the private sector which stands to gain from what could amount to a new industrial revolution.
Cooke worries that the emphasis on zero-sum competition with China over recent years will make broad cooperation in climate change extremely difficult. “The competition drive is spilling into areas that used to be defined by cooperation,” he said. One example is the network of 11 national-level eco parks organized through the Greater Philadelphia-Tianjin EcoPartnership. Germany invested in one such park in 2020, focused on green maritime technology, to the tune of more than $3 billion. The PHL-TJ EcoPartnership had defined a focus on energy-efficient, securely smart and healthy buildings at sustainable-city scale for this network of 11 eco-parks. The emphasis was on large-scale opportunities supported by very large companies and leavened by the innovation of smaller, entrepreneurial companies. “Given the problems in the bilateral relationship, that large scale opportunity has receded for the foreseeable future at least.”
Enter the contradiction
Cooke is highly attuned to the potential for contradiction between commercial competition and climate cooperation, worrying that when Kerry steps down, the space for commercially led environmental solutions to be applied at scale and speed in the two largest global economies will shrink even more.
“What used to be very effective work through industrial cooperation in lowering emissions is now off the table, though some academic and some intergovernmental climate cooperation continues.” He concedes that the continuation of even these relationships is not assured given the political environment in both countries.
“My organization was about creating a platform for a US-Sino Eco-Park in China bringing advanced energy efficiency services and technologies to the park. That is viewed negatively now in Washington. What’s disappointing is that other countries friendly to us are now established in China in commercial areas that we’re better at but won’t be able to contribute to because official reluctance for cooperation.”
Cooke says: “The United States needs to be smart about its clean energy approach to China. Yes, China wants to dominate an emerging 21st century industry. But if we out-innovate and out-compete China technologically, we can access their market profitably and also collaborate commercially to forestall the worst effects of climate change. Is it really in the US interest not to have active engagement with China, aside from discrete small companies that are more easily taken advantage of? I’d prefer to see us going in with a convoy approach of large companies and smaller innovators protected by US government policies and focused on delivering measurable, low-carbon solutions at a globally impactful scale. To my mind, this is a huge missed opportunity.”
Cooke’s non-profit, which he recently rebranded as ReGen250 to accommodate additional, non-China-focused environmental programs, continues to assess options for low-carbon partnerships with China. What elements would a US private sector partner want to support that his organization could strongly endorse? “Alternatively, we can just decide we’re only going to focus on local programs in the Mid-Atlantic to increase access to a greener built environment.”
What about the Department of Energy’s prior interest in cooperation? “I have had some high-level discussions within the Department. The entire group that previously supported the commercial exchange at this high level between the national government and subnational actors, including Eco-Partners and city level groups, is not active right now. It was disappointing to learn that.”
“Despite the challenges in the US-China relationship, subnational initiatives, especially in energy and climate change mitigation solutions, should be encouraged and supported.”
Despite the setbacks, Cooke believes there are still areas for engagement with China regardless of the government in power. One involves people-to-people exchanges, albeit challenging at the present moment given China’s zero-COVID policies. Examples of programs that deserve to survive are the adoption of Chinese children, music (he helped the Philadelphia Orchestra create an artist residency program in China) and artistic exchange, student exchange, and most importantly, business. He believes that the once promising universe of business cooperation has constricted but there still remain spaces outside of sensitive technologies where businesses can and must connect.
As a member of the local ecosystem that support US-China commercial relations, he’s not giving up. Rather, he envisions the different China business-related ecosystems across the United States networking and sharing best practices. He said that one such effort was made recently at a Midwest university, but he expressed some disappointment at the fact that the focus turned out to be on a recently discovered vulnerability involving WeChat. It was a security-led briefing, not the commercially minded dialogue that is needed.
Cooke isn’t ready to walk away from his gift of multi-stakeholder cooperation on climate change or the imperative for non-profits like his to act locally and globally. “Efforts at the subnational level have an important place in helping American companies navigate a complex environment in China. They have a great potential impact because they can organize a well-protected convoy in the place of one isolated boat, big or small.”
“Despite the challenges in the US-China relationship, subnational initiatives, especially in energy and climate change mitigation solutions, should be encouraged and supported.”
(view original article in USCBC’s Fifty States, Fifty Stories series)
______Assessing China / The TEA Collaborative______ 